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APPENDIX B

DOCUMENT DONITZ-100 1
TESTIMONY OF FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ, U.S. NAVY, 11 MAY
1946, REGARDING NAVAL WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC FROM
7 DECEMBER 1941, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
THE RESCUE OF SURVIVORS OF SUNK ENEMY SHIPS (EXHIBIT DONITZ-100)
11 May 1946
INTERROGATION OF FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ,
U.S. NAVY
At the request of the International Military Tribunal the following
interrogatories were on this date, 11 May 1946, put to Fleet Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy by Lieutenant Commander Joseph L.
Broderick, U.S. Naval Reserve, of the International Law Section, Office
of the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.,
who recorded verbatim the testimony of the witness.
Admiral Nimitz was duly sworn by Lieutenant Commander Broderick
and interrogated as follows:
Q. What is your name, rank and present station?
A. Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of
Naval Operations of the United States Navy.
1. Q. What positions in the U.S. Navy did you hold from December
1941 until May 1945?
A. Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
2. Q. Did the U.S.A. in her sea warfare against Japan announce
certain waters to be areas of operation, blockade, danger, restri~
tion, warning or the like?
A. Yes. For the purpose of command of operations against Japan
the Pacific Ocean areas were declared a theater of operations.
3. Q. If yes, was it customary in such areas for submarines to attack
merchantmen without warning with the exception of her own
and those of her Allies?
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A. Yes, with the exception of hospital ships and other vessels under
4. Q.

A.
5. Q.

A.

6. Q.
A.

"safe conduct" voyages for humanitarian purposes.
Were you under orders to do so?
The Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 ordered
unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan.
Was it customary for submarines to attack Japanese merchantmen without warning-outside of announced operation or similar areas since the outbreak of the war?
The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside the
limits of my command during the \var; therefore I make no
reply thereto.
Were you under orders to do so?
The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside the
limits of my command during the war, therefore I make no
reply thereto.

-Page 27. Q. If the practise of attacking without warning did not exist since
the outbreak of the war, did it exist from a later date on? From
what date on?
A. The practice existed from 7 December 1941 in the declared
zone of operations.
8. Q. Did this practice correspond to issued orders?
A. Yes.
9. Q. Did it become known to the U.S. Naval authorities that Japanese merchantmen were under orders to report any sighted U.S.
submarine to the Japanese Armed Forces by radio? If yes, when
did it become known?
A. During the course of the war it became known to the U.S.
Naval authorities that Japanese merchantmen in fact reported
by radio to Japanese armed forces any information regarding
sighting of U.S. submarines.
10. Q. Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order to attack
without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did not
exist already before? If yes, when?
A. The order existed from 7 December 1941.
11. Q. Did it become known to the U.S. Naval authorities that the
Japanese Merchantmen were under orders to attack any U.S.
submarine in any way suitable according to the situation, for
instance by ramming, gun fire or by depth charges. If yes, when
did it become known?
A. Japanese merchantmen were usually armed and always attacked
by any available means when feasible.
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12. Q. Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order of attacking without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did
not already exist before? If yes, when?
A. The order existed from 7 December 1941.
13. Q. Were, by order or on general principles, the U.S. submarines
prohibited from carrying out rescue measures toward passengers
and crews of ships sunk without warning in those cases where
by doing so the safety of the own boat was endangered?
-Page 3A. On general principles the U.S. submarines did not rescue enemy
survivors if undue additional hazard to the submarine resulted
or the submarine would thereby be prevented from accomplishing its further mission. U.S. submarines were limited in rescue
measures by small passenger-carrying facilities combined with the
known desperate and suicidal character of the enemy. Therefore
it was unsafe to pick up many survivors. Frequently survivors
were given rubber boats and/or provisions. Almost invariably
survivors did not come aboard the submarine voluntarily and
it was necessary to take them prisoner by force.
14. Q. If such an order or principle did not exist, did the U.S. submarines actually carry out rescue measures in the above mentioned cases?
A. In numerous cases enemy survivors were rescued by U.S. submannes.
15. Q. In answering the above question, does the expression "merchantmen" mean any other kind of ships than those which were
not warships?
A. No. By "merchantmen" I mean all types of ships which were
not combatant ships. Used in this sense it includes fishing
boats, etc.
16. Q. If yes, what kind of ships?
A. The last answer covers this question.
17. Q. Has any order of the U.S. Naval authorities mentioned in the
above questionnaire concerning the tactics of U.S. submarines
toward Japanese merchantmen been based on the grounds of
reprisal? If yes, what orders?
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7
December 1941 resulted from the recognition of Japanese tactics
revealed on that date. No further orders to U.S. submarines
concerning tactics toward Japanese merchantmen throughout
the war were based on reprisal, although specific instances of
Japanese submarines' committing atrocities toward U.S. mer-
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chant marine survivors became known and would have justified
such a course.
-Page 418. Q. Has this order or have these orders of the Japanese Government
been announced as reprisals?
A. The question is not clear. Therefore I make no reply thereto.
19. Q. On the basis of what Japanese tactics was the reprisal considered
justified?
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the
Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified
by the Japanese attacks on that date on U.S. bases, and on both
armed and unarmed ships and nationals, without warning or
declaration of war.
'
The above record of my testmony has been examined by me on this
date and is in all respects accurate and true.
11 May 1946
Chester W. Nimitz
CHESTER W. NIMITZ
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy
The witness, Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, was duly
sworn by me prior to giving the above testimony and I do certify that
the above is a true record of the testimony given by him.
11 May 1946
Joseph L. Broderick
JOSEPH L. BRODERICK
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.
Naval Reserve

